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Abstract
Over the last 30 years stock market participation has increased
and the equity premium has declined, this would presumably lead to a
decrease in wealth inequality. However, just the opposite has happened
as wealth inequality has increased. I propose a general equilibrium
model which can both resolve the equity premium puzzle and reproduce
the high inequality of wealth seen in the data. I use this model to show
that increasing wage inequality can reconcile the initially incompatible
observations above. I also use the model to show that changes in
age demographics may be responsible for a significant fraction of the
decreasing equity premium.
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1 Introduction
There has been a large increase in stock market participation over the last
quarter century; 30% of the population now directly hold stocks or mu-
tual funds and upwards of a half have indirect holdings. This shift is often
attributed to decreased costs of participating in financial markets and is po-
tentially responsible for a drop in the equity premium. Along with increased
participation we should expect to see a shift in the wealth distribution as
well: as more agents have access to higher paying assets, the gap between
the rich and the poor should decrease. However, just the opposite has hap-
pened; the richest 1% now hold 32% of all wealth compared to 19% in 1976.
Consumption inequality on the other hand has barely increased at all. The
missing piece is income inequality, which has also increased. In this paper
I propose a general equilibrium model in which increasing income inequal-
ity contributes to an increase in wealth inequality, however improved risk
sharing opportunities, which are observed through increased participation
and a decreased equity premium lead to only small increases in consumption
inequality.
To explain the above effects this paper must be able to reproduce two
effects which are generally difficult to model: the high degree of wealth
inequality observed in the data and the high equity premium. The model is
in the style of Aiyagari (1994) and more recently Krussell and Smith (1998)
in that ex-ante identical agents are facing uninsurable idiosyncratic wage
shocks as well as aggregate risk. Agents can save through investing in risky
stocks and risk free bonds. As is documented in many papers dealing with
such models, most agents are pretty good at self insurance and as a result the
equity premium is low. Furthermore, all but the poorest agents have a very
similar propensity to save, thus there isn’t much consumption inequality.
Additional frictions are needed to get more heterogeneity within the
model. All agents are free to invest in the risk free asset, however agents
must pay a cost if they choose to participate in the equity market. While
I give no specific reasons for this cost, it is meant to be a combination
of transaction, informational, and any other potential costs of participation.
The cost causes poor agents to invest in the bond only, while the richer agents
invest in stocks as well as bonds. Adding costs decreases demand for stocks,
thus their price falls and conversely the equity premium rises. Since rich
agents now face higher average returns, there is more wealth inequality than
in the no costs case. The saving propensity is now significantly higher for the
rich, which magnifies the inequality. With costs high enough (about 1.5%
of wealth invested per year) to match observed stock market participation
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rates, the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution approaches real world
values.
Much of the wealth belonging to the rich is tied up in stocks and since
stock returns are quite risky, the wealth and consumption of stockholders
are much more volatile than that of non-stockholders. When aggregate
consumption is used to price stocks, the familiar equity premium puzzle
appears: stocks appear to be too risky or agents or agents too risk averse.
Of course when the correct consumption growth is used, namely stockholder
consumption, the equity premium puzzle disappears.
Armed with a model which, through differences in wages and investment
returns, can account for the high amount of wealth inequality, I aim to jointly
explain historical trends in inequality, market participation, and the equity
premium. When costs to investing are decreased with no other changes, mar-
ket participation increases and the equity premium falls, however inequality
decreases drastically as well. When wage inequality increases, while keeping
all else equal, both wealth and consumption inequality increase while stock
market participation falls slightly. When costs decrease and wage inequality
increases (the scenario which seems to have occurred over the last quarter
century), wealth inequality still rises by a fair amount while consumption in-
equality much less so. At the same time stock market participation increases
and the equity premium falls. An interesting additional effect is a loosening
of borrowing constraints, which leads to both increased wealth inequality
but a decreased consumption inequality because poorer people become less
afraid of bad times and thus consume more and save less.
Another interesting question this model is well equipped to answer is
what effect the change in aging demographics has had and will have on as-
set pricing. Because people are living longer, as well as because the baby
boomers are reaching middle age, the percentage of people older than 45 in
the population has nearly doubled. Because older people tend to be wealth-
ier, and wealthier people are more likely to invest in stocks, this population
shift should increase market participation and reduce the equity premium.
That is indeed what happens when I increase the lifespan of agents in the
model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II sum-
marizes relevant empirical findings on inequality and market participation.
Section III describes the baseline model and the solution method. Section
IV provides results from the baseline model, specifically it proposes an ex-
planation for the equity premium puzzle. Section V extends the model and
compares steady states to explain observed historical trends in inequality
and market participation. Section VI examines the effect of a shift in age
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demographics on asset pricing. Section VII concludes.
2 Trends in Inequality and Market Participation
All of the trends in this section have been documented in a variety of papers
and my goal here is not to provide a comprehensive report on the desired
statistics but rather a summary of the major trends, their direction and mag-
nitudes. In some cases I will provide evidence from the Survey of Consumer
Finance, in others findings from other papers will suffice.
Figure 1 plots the Gini coefficient for wealth and wages from the SCF.
Data is restricted to include households with the head between the ages 25
and 65 but is not filtered in any other way. Wealth inequality is much larger
than wage inequality, with Gini coefficients of around .8 compared to .5.
However the increase in wealth inequality has been much smaller than that
of wage inequality. Between 1983 and 2004 the Gini coefficient for wealth
rises from .76 to .80, while for wages the change is from .42 to .52. To put
the numbers in perspective in 1983 the richest 1% held 22% of all wealth,
by 2004 they held 32%; in 1983 the highest 1% of earners received 6.56% of
all wages earned, by 2004 they received 12.52%. Another useful statistic is
the cross-sectional volatility of wages which has nearly doubled from 1.057
in 1983 to 1.986 in 2004. Note that this does not control for fixed effects
such as age and education, thus this is only indirectly related to the volatil-
ity of the idiosyncratic wage shock in the model. Krueger and Perri (2005)
use the Consumer Expenditure Survey to calculate the Gini coefficient for
consumption, which is also reproduced in Figure 1. Consumption inequality
is much lower than those for both wealth and income, averaging around .25
and rising by only .02 over the sample.
[Figure 1: Gini coefficients for wealth, wages, income, consumption]
Participation in the stock market has also increased over the last quarter
century. In the same SCF data set, the percentage of households who had
positive wealth in directly held stocks or mutual funds was 20.4% in 1983,
rose to over 30% in 2001, and fell slightly to 28.2% in 2004. This likely
underestimates participation because people often hold stocks indirectly, for
example in their pension accounts.
It is important to note, both for the validity and relevance of this pa-
per, that the market’s performance has an important impact on the wealth
distribution. While data on the change of the wealth distribution through
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time is limited, it does seem consistent with inequality increasing during
expansions. Figure 2 plots the change in wealth inequality over the previous
three years on the y-axis, and the average stock return over those three years
on the x-axis; Panel A comes from my model, Panel B from the SCF, and
Panel C from the Forbes 400. In all 3 plots inequality is positively related
to stock return.
[Figure 2: Change in inequality as related to stock return]
While the exact expected equity premium is impossible to compute, many
believe it has been falling. Fama and French (2002) use fundamentals to
calculate the equity premium and estimate that the expected premium was
4.17% between 1872 and 1950, and just 2.55% between 1950 and 2000. Pas-
tor and Stambaugh (2001) look for structural breaks in the premium and
believe that since 1940 it has dropped from above 6% to below 5%.
Costs of participation in the stock market are also believed to be de-
creasing. Add summary of some papers on participation costs.
3 The Baseline Model
I study a version of the real business cycle model, first studied by Ramsey
(1928) and used extensively in macroeconomics. In what follows I will set up
and solve the stationary problem. In the appendix I show that the solution
of the problem with a deterministic growth rate is just a simple transforma-
tion of the stationary problem. For the results I transform everything to the
growth problem. This model is closest to Krussell and Smith (1998b), how-
ever, as in most production economies, volatility of equity is unrealistically
low in their model. Since the volatility of equity is crucial for both pricing
equity, and changes in the wealth distribution, I add several frictions to get
this number in line with realistic values.
3.1 Agents
All agents are ex-ante identical and maximize the expected present value of
utility. At the beginning of a period agents differ from one another only by
the amount of wealth each holds. At the end of the period agents receive a
wage; this wage is an idiosyncratic random variable which cannot be insured.
The agents are not infinitely lived, but rather have a probability of dying
each period. This probability is constant (i.e. it does not depend on the
agent’s age) and there is no bequest motive. Because agents are expected
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utility maximizers, for the purpose of optimization the probability of death
is combined with the actual time discount factor to form an adjusted time
discount factor. Each period the same number of agents are born as die
so the total number remains the same. Each newborn agent receives the
average wealth of deceased agents, thus the total wealth in the economy is
conserved.
Upon entering a period an agent chooses whether to enter into a venture
or not. Agents who do not enter into a venture can invest their money
in the risk free asset as well as earn labor income. Agents who do enter
into a venture (the stockholders) can also invest in the risk free asset and
earn labor income. However additionally they can earn a return (the equity
return) on the wealth committed to the venture. Agents must pay a fixed
cost F to enter into a venture. Each agent’s wage is the aggregate wage
multiplied by an idiosyncratic labor shock.
Let be W it be agent i’s individual wealth, w
i
t+1 be his wage, St be the
vector of all relevant state variables, Zt+1 be the vector of realizations of all
aggregate random variables (these are the ZSt+1 and Z
A
t+1 described in the
technology section) and Zit+1 be the realization of the agent’s idiosyncratic
labor shock. The agent’s choice variables are consumption Cit , and the ratio
of wealth to invest in the risk free asset αit. At the start of the period each
agent solves:
V (W it , St) = max
Cit ,α
i
t
E
∞∑
i=1
βt
(Cit)
1−θ
1− θ s.t.
W it+1 = (α
i
tR
f
t+1 + (1− αit)Ret+1)(W it − Cit) + wit+1L− F1α<1 (1a)
wt+1 =W(St, Zt+1) (average wage) (1b)
wit+1 = wt+1Z
i
t+1 (individual wage) (1c)
Rft = Rf (St) (risk free rate) (1d)
Ret+1 = Re(St, Zt+1) (equity return) (1e)
St+1 = Γ(St, Zt+1) (law of motion for state variables) (1f)
W it+1 ≥Wmin (borrowing constraint), (1e)
where W, Rf , Re, and Γ are functions indicating the agent’s beliefs about
the economy. Given such functions, this problem can be solved indepen-
dently of the production side. These functions will be determined in equi-
librium. Equation (1a) is the wealth accumulation equation, (1b)-(1e) define
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the agent’s beliefs about the wage and asset processes, and (1f) is the agent’s
belief about the law of motion of the state variables.
The definition of the state variables is crucial for the computational
strategy, however, a key point is that from the point of view of the agent,
the identity of the state variables does not matter. The agent can think of
S as a set of numbers from one to NS , and as long as the observed law of
motion for these numbers is the same as Γ, it makes no difference to the
agent what these numbers actually represent. From the problem solver’s
point of view S will consist of the aggregate productivity state, and the
shape of the wealth distribution.
3.2 Firms
Output is determined by a Cobb-Douglas technology where capital depreci-
ates at a rate δ. Given physical capital Kt, labor L (which is fixed in this
model), and the productivity shock ZSt+1, output Yt is determined by
Yt = ZSt+1K
ψ
t L
1−ψ.
After paying out wages, the firm returns the residual to the stockholders.
The firm’s problem is to maximize expected stockholder value:
pit+1 = max
L
E[Mt+1(ZSt+1K
ψ
t L
1−ψ + (1− δ)Kt − wtL)] (2)
whereMt+1 is the discount factor determined in equilibrium from the marginal
rate of substitution of the stockholders. Firms take Mt+1 as given. Wages1
are
wt =
E[ZSt+1Mt+1]
E[Mt+1]
(1− ψ)
(
Kt
L
)ψ
. (3)
The return2 to investors is the total payout to investors, divided by total
capital invested:
Ret+1 =
(
ZSt+1 − (1− ψ)
E[ZSt+1Mt+1]
E[Mt+1]
)(
Kt
L
)ψ−1
+ (1− δ). (4)
1The only difference from the original equation for wages is that Zt+1 is replaced by
E[ZSt+1Mt+1]
E[Mt+1]
. If the shock is negatively correlated with the marginal rate of substitution
(that is if the shock is high when consumption growth is high), wages are lower than the
average wage in the variable wage case.
2This return is equal to the expected marginal product of capital plus the non-zero
profit that comes after the shock is realized. When wages can vary, the variability of
output is split between returns and wages, now the variability of output is absorbed fully
by returns.
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The actual return is levered and is related to this return on capital by
equation 5, given below. I will now discuss in detail some of the differences
between this model and the standard real business cycles model.
3.3 Financial Leverage
In the real world, a firm’s equity return is not typically equal to the aggregate
return on the firm’s capital because equity is the claim to the riskiest part
of the firm’s output, the other part being bonds. Similarly the return on
the S&P 500 is not equal to the return on the aggregate American economy.
It would be misleading to talk about an economy whose aggregate return is
calibrated to the U.S. stock market. Following Boldrin, Christiano, Fisher
(1999) I add the more realistic assumption of financial leverage.
Let λ be the debt to capital ratio in this economy, for simplicity it will
be constant. The firm now issues one period bonds in amount to match
its desired leverage ratio, that is λKt. The bond’s interest rate is to be
determined in equilibrium. The equity is now a call option on the firm’s
output, with strike price equal to the bond’s value multiplied by the interest
rate. While this bond may, in theory, be risky it is risk free for all sets
of parameters I consider. Let Ret+1, defined in the previous section, be the
aggregate return on the firm’s assets. Then the equity return is:
Re∗t+1 = R
f
t + (
1
1− λ)(R
e
t+1 −Rft ) (5)
and this return, as well as its variance, increases with the amount of leverage.
3.4 Predetermined Wages
In most models wages are set to be the marginal product of labor, which
means they vary with the realization of the productivity shock. In the real
world employees typically know their hourly wage or annual salary for the
near future (of course productivity can change the total payout by affecting
hours worked or bonuses). In this model the wage contract must be spec-
ified before the shock is realized. This means the firm will be maximizing
an expectation of future profits. The payout to the stockholders is then the
realized output, less the contracted wage. Boldrin and Horvath (1995) use
a similar formulation. Having a guaranteed salary provides workers with a
safety net, thus they are more willing to take risks with the rest of their
wealth, allowing a higher equity premium. In much the same way as fi-
nancial leverage, predetermined wages work to make equity return absorb a
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larger portion of the productivity shock, allowing a higher volatility. Fun-
damentally, a contract to pay out a wage is similar to a corporate bond.
3.5 Timing
The agent enters a period knowing St as well as his own wealth, and then
decides how much to consume and invest given that his return on investment
and his wages are random and depend on the shock. This timing is unortho-
dox in two ways. First of all, capital and labor must be committed prior
to the realization of the shock. Boldrin, Christiano, Fisher (1999) call this
the Time-to-Plan assumption and find that it alone has little effect on the
standard model. This assumption ensures that at the time of committing
capital, the agent does not know what the equity return will be.
The other unusual feature is the timing of consumption (Krussell and
Smith 1998b also use this timing convention). Typically in RBC models
agents consume after production, and the capital accumulation equation is
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + f(Kt, L)− Ct
where investment is f(Kt, L)− Ct. Here agents make the consumption and
portfolio choice simultaneously and the accumulation equation is
Kt+1 = (1− δ)(Kt − Ct) + f(Kt − Ct, L).
This timing is more in line with the portfolio choice literature. Investment
is now defined as f(Kt, L) − Ct. I believe that both of these deviations
from the traditional RBC timing scheme bring this model closer to reality
in terms of financial investing but have little or no effect on aggregate results.
[Figure 3: Timeline of Events Within a Period]
3.6 Uncertainty
The aggregate productivity shock ZSt+1 follows an ARMA(1,1) process as
opposed to the typical AR(1). This means that the conditional mean of the
productivity shock ZAt is AR(1). The idea is that the economy can be in
a good or bad state, represented by ZA, but production may turn out to
be low even in the good state, or high even in the bad state. This setup,
rather than the standard AR(1) technology shock, is helpful in allowing the
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volatility of returns to stay high, while keeping the volatility of the risk
free rate low. The ARMA(1,1) seems to work well for asset pricing, for
example it is used by Bansal and Yaron (2004). Furthermore, upon fitting
the Solow residual to an ARMA(1,1) I find that both the AR(1) and MA(1)
components are highly significant.
The direction of the idiosyncratic labor shock is independent each period.
Making it Markovian would have require an additional state variable and
thus longer computational time. Zi will have mean 1 and take values 1 ±
σ(ZA). A more realistic labor income process is adopted in the next section.
3.7 Cost of Investing in Equity
Even with additional volatility of returns, rich agents and poor agents are
still quite similar as all have access to stocks, and the average excess stock
return is still quite low. To increase the equity premium and add hetero-
geneity I add another friction. All agents are free to invest in the risk free
asset, however agents must pay a cost if they choose to participate in the
equity market. While I give no specific reasons for this cost, it is meant to be
a combination of transaction, informational, and any other potential costs of
participation. The cost causes poor agents to invest in the bond only, while
the richer agents invest in stocks as well as bonds. This lowers demand for
stocks and thus raises the equity premium. Since rich agents now face higher
average returns, the wealth distribution becomes more unequal out than in
the no costs case.
3.8 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is defined by decision rule functions α(W it , St) and C(W it , St);
aggregate quantity functions Γ(St, Zt+1),Rf (St),Re(St, Zt+1), andW(St, Zt+1);
and a function of the firm’s belief Φ(St, Zt+1) such that for any St:
(i) α(W it , St), C(W it , St) solve agent’s maximization problem given Γ(St, Zt+1),
Rf (St), Re(St, Zt+1), W(St, Zt+1).
(ii) Re(St, Zt+1) is given by (4) and (5) with Kt =
∫
(1 − α(W it , St))(W it −
C(W it , St))di,
(iii)
∫
α(W it , St))(W
i
t − C(W it , St))di = λKt,
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(iv) St+1 = Γ(St, Zt+1).
(v) Φ(St, Zt+1) =
ZSt+1MRSt+1
E[MRSt+1]
where MRSt+1 is the marginal rate of substi-
tutions for stockholders.
Condition (i) requires that all choices made by agents are optimal. Con-
dition (iii) is the market clearing condition, it states that the bond, in excess
of leverage, is in zero net supply on the aggregate; together with condition
(ii) this implies that all aggregate capital that is not consumed is used in
production. Condition (iv) ensures rational behavior, if it holds the econ-
omy behaves exactly as the agents expect it should. Condition (v) states
that the firm’s beliefs about the preferences of its stock holders are in fact
rational.
3.9 Solving the Model
The algorithm is described in detail in Favilukis (2006b), however, it may be
useful to outline it here. The key issue in solving for equilibrium is summa-
rizing the state space. The state space includes all the possible distributions
of wealth across agents, an infinite dimensional object. Krussell and Smith
(1998) use just the first moment of the distribution as the state variable,
however the model above is much more tumultuous than theirs. For example
the volatility of equity returns is 16% here compared to below 1% in their
model. I find that the first moment just isn’t enough to satisfy equilibrium
conditions. I add the shape, or probability density function (demeaned) as
the second moment. That is, realizations of the second state variable are
just histograms of wealth held by agents. These histograms are chosen in
such a way (described below) to sufficiently summarize all possible variation
in the wealth distribution.
Given functions W, Rf , Re, and Γ the agent’s problem can be solved in
partial equilibrium, independent of the production side. I start with a guess
for these functions and solve the agent’s problem for policy functions. I also
start with a guess of how wealth is distributed among agents. Given policy
functions and the distribution of wealth, in each state I solve for aggregate
investment, bond demand, and next period’s distribution. Given aggregate
investment, I solve for W and Re in each state. By comparing next year’s
distribution to the existing distributions in the state space under the L1
measure I compute Γ. For markets to clear excess bond demand must be
exactly zero in each state, which suggests a way to update Rf . If excess
bond demand is positive, I decrease Rf ; I increase it in the opposite case.
With updated values for these four functions, I resolve the agent’s problem.
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This process continues until excess bond demand is zero in every state.
If the initial guess for possible wealth distributions was exactly right, the
above procedure would produce a solution, however that is unlikely to be the
case and we need a richer set of distributions. Given the above policy func-
tions I now simulate the problem for many years and randomly pick several
of the occurring distributions to add to the state space. With a larger set of
distributions in the state space, the process starts once again. Eventually,
once enough distributions are in the state space, an approximate equilib-
rium is achieved in that all equilibrium conditions hold approximately. This
process works because even though the state space for distributions is fi-
nite, the distributions in it come from actual simulation of the problem; any
wealth distribution that is likely to occur will be well approximated by one
of the distributions in the state space. Figure 4 provides a diagram of the
numerical solution algorithm.
[Figure 4: Diagram of numerical solution algorithm]
4 Baseline Model Results
4.1 Parameters
Some of the parameters are conventional and I take their values from the
literature. In particular, depreciation is 10%, capital’s share is .36, lifespan
is 40 years (this is the amount of time an individual earns wages and accu-
mulates capital), and the economy grows at 2% annually. The duration of
recessions and expansion is set to match NBER data, the transition matrix
for ZA (the variable indicating the aggregate state) is[
.0826 .9174
.4255 .5745
]
.
There is some evidence that individual wages are more variable during bad
times, thus the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock is 40% in bad times
and 20% in good times; this is in line with various estimates found in the
literature. The aggregate leverage ratio λ is chosen to be 2/3. I also set the
borrowing constraint such that next year’s wealth must not be negative.
This leaves risk aversion (θ), time preference (β), cost of investing (F)
and the volatility of aggregate shocks as free parameters. I set these param-
eters to match the historical mean and volatility of stock returns (7% and
12
16%) and the historical mean and volatility of bond returns (1% and 4%),
while keeping stock market participation at around 15%. I set β = .985,
θ = 10.5 and the cost to approximately 3% of wealth invested. When ZA is
high, ZS is .81 or 1.14 with equal probability, when ZA is low, it is .86 and
1.19. Table 1 presents several unconditional asset pricing moments from the
baseline model. These moments are quantitatively similar to those observed
in the data.
[Table 1: Unconditional Moments for Returns and Participation]
4.2 The Equity Premium Puzzle
Table 2A shows the mean cross-sectional variation of capital and consump-
tion growth. That is, each period I compute the standard deviation of a
variable, then I report the average standard deviation across time. Cross-
sectional variation in capital growth is 2.5 times higher for non-stockholders
than for stockholders. This is because investment income within each group
moves together but the wage shock is a much bigger part of the non-
stockholder’s income. Cross-sectional variation in consumption growth is
much smaller than capital growth, suggesting presence of insurance. This
variation for non-stockholders is 50% larger than for stockholders.
Next, for each period I compute the cross-sectional average of consump-
tion growth for each group. This gives me a time series of average stock-
holder and non-stockholder consumption growth. Even though in cross-
section stockholder wealth tends to move together much more so than that
of non-stockholders, in times-series their wealth is much more volatile (Ta-
ble 2B). This is because stock returns are much riskier than bond returns.
Stockholder consumption is also more volatile, but less so than the wealth.
In Table 2C we see that non-stockholder consumption growth is highly corre-
lated with aggregate consumption, stockholder is slightly less so. Conversely,
stockholder consumption growth is highly correlated with the excess stock
return, non-stockholder is less so. These correlations are unrealistically high,
but this is a problem common to most production economy models.
[Table 2: Asset Pricing]
If an agent is acting rationally, his consumption growth, plugged into an
Euler equation, should leave zero pricing errors for the assets he has access
too. An agent’s consumption should not necessarily price assets he cannot
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hold. Furthermore aggregated consumption should not necessarily price any
assets correctly.
Within the context of this model the consumption of each individual
stockholder should price both the bond and the stock and the consumption
of each non-stockholder should price the bond only. Table 2A suggests that
since there is little within group variation, average stockholder consumption
growth should do well to substitute for individual stockholder consumption
growth, and the same for average versus individual non-stockholder growth.
At the same time, Table 2B suggests there will be differences between using
the right pricing kernel (individual consumption growth of agent holding
that particular asset), and the wrong kernel (such as aggregate consumption
or wrong agent’s consumption).
Table 2D confirms this. When using individual stockholder consumption
in the pricing kernel, the pricing error on the equity premium and is nearly
zero, when using non-stockholder consumption, the error is close to 4% per
year, and it is 3% per year when using aggregate consumption. The Euler
equation errors for stockholders and non-stockholders pricing bonds are both
nearly zero.
It is possible to use the right and wrong consumption in GMM to back
out the preference parameters (Table 2E). The model’s parameters are esti-
mated correctly when stockholder consumption is used in the pricing kernel.
On the other hand, aggregate consumption significantly overestimates risk
aversion (θ = 24.75), thus, while equity is priced correctly within the model,
the econometrician would mistakenly find an equity premium puzzle if using
aggregate consumption. These results are consistent with the pricing errors
in Table 2D.
4.3 The Wealth Distribution
The moments and Gini coefficient for the baseline wealth distribution, as
well as historical wealth distributions are in Table 3. While the model pro-
duces a fair amount of inequality, it is still far below that of the data. One
component missing from the model is age demographics; because wages tend
to rise with age, the Gini coefficient for the population as a whole will have
more inequality than what is caused by idiosyncratic shocks alone. Another
missing component is the persistence of wages; persistent shocks should
create more inequality than i.i.d. shocks. The next section addresses per-
sistence by introducing a more realistic wage process. The following section
addresses age demographics.
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[Table 3: Wealth Inequality]
An interesting observation for modeling the wealth distribution is that both
limited participation and idiosyncratic wage shocks are necessary to get high
inequality. When there are no wage shocks, there is nothing to separate the
agents so costs will not induce limited participation. When there are wage
shocks, but all agents have similar returns on investments, wage differences
are just not big enough to translate to large differences in wealth.
5 An Explanation of Historical Trends
5.1 A More Realistic Wage Process
In the baseline model wealth inequality is not nearly as high as the data
and one of the main reasons is that wage inequality is not at all persistent
in the model, while it is very persistent in the real world. A common way to
model real world wages is with an ARMA(1,1) process. The idiosyncratic
wage shock U it is:
U it = A
i + Zit + ²
i
t (6a)
where
Zit = ρZ
i
t−1 + η
i
t. (6b)
Ai includes ”at birth” fixed effects such as race or education, ²it is an i.i.d.
random variable, and Zit is a slow moving AR component. Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2003) estimate ρ = .9989, σ(A) = .2105, σ(η) = .063,
and σ(η) = .016.
Allowing for this whole process would require the addition of two state
variables and one random variable to the current process. While this is a
potential future extension, at the moment it is too computationally intensive
to model the whole process. Instead I will model the idiosyncratic wage
process as
U it = A
i + ²it (6c)
thus dropping the AR component. Each of the pieces that is kept contributes
more to the year-to-year variance of wages than the piece left out, so this
approximation is reasonable. Each agent enters the work force with the
constant component of wages Ai (for example education level), but his actual
wage will be subject to additional i.i.d. shocks. The agent’s total wage is
U it multiplied by the average wage in the economy.
This formulation allows for a higher inequality in wealth than does the
baseline model. This is because wage inequality is now much more persistent.
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For example, in the baseline model the cross-sectional standard deviation of
wages is 30% and the Gini coefficient of wealth is .32. Of the various cases
I try with the new formulation, the standard deviation of wages is between
20% and 30% and the Gini coefficient is between .39 and .48. While this is
still not quite as high as the .79 in the real world, it is significantly closer.
5.2 Changes in Participation Costs and Wage Volatility
The cross-sectional distribution of wages is a lot more unequal today than
it was 25 years ago. Presumably, the costs of investing in the stock market
have also fallen over that period. This paper takes no stand on why these
two phenomena may have occurred and assumes they are external structural
changes in the underlying parameters. The right way to model such changes
would be for the agents to have a prior about these changes occurring and
to act accordingly, however this would require a model much more complex
than the current one. A simpler route, which should still provide much
insight, is to compare steady states of the model under different parameter
combinations. Fundamentally, this means the world has changed and agents
were not anticipating this change. These results are in Table 4.
The first case I consider is a high cost, low volatility of wages scenario,
presumably the world prior to 1983. Low volatility of wages corresponds
to σ(A) = 17.5% and σ(²) = 5%. High costs correspond to F being ap-
proximately 1.7% of wealth. In this case the inequality of income and con-
sumption are both low, as is participation in the stock market; the equity
premium on the other hand is high.
The next case is low volatility of wages and low cost of investment which
corresponds to about 1.2% of wealth. Not surprisingly, participation jumps
and the equity premium falls slightly due to increased demand for stocks.
However both wealth and consumption inequality fall significantly. This is
because many more agents now have access to better investment opportu-
nities. Since wealth inequality has actually increased over the last 25 years,
considering just a decrease in costs is not enough.
If volatility of wages increases so that σ(A) = 25% and σ(²) = 5%
but costs remain the high, inequality in both consumption and wealth rises
significantly, however participation in the market decreases and the equity
premium rises. The reason participation falls is that, since markets must
clear and excess bond demand must be zero, when the very rich hold rela-
tively more wealth and thus more stocks, the middle and lower classes must
hold less stocks.
Decreasing costs and raising wage inequality simultaneously achieves the
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desired result; this is the world of 2004. The Gini coefficients for wealth and
consumption increase by about .04 and .01 respectively, approximately the
amount of increase in the data. At the same time participation rises by
4.5%, somewhat less than in the data, and the equity premium falls by .5%.
An additional effect, which up to now has not been considered here, is
the borrowing constraint. Loosening the constraint allows agents to borrow
more when they are poor; it should have little effect on the policies of the rich
but should make the poor less averse to having low wealth. Thus the poor
will consume relatively more and save relatively less; this should increase
wealth inequality but decrease consumption inequality. Indeed, when the
borrowing constraint is relaxed, allowing agents’ wealth to be as low as
−32% of average wealth (compared to −16% before), the Gini coefficient for
wealth increases by .04 compared to the low cost, high volatility case but
participation decreases only slightly. Since borrowing opportunities have
likely increased over the last 25 years, this effect has important real world
consequences.
5.3 Changing Age Demographics
All results in this section are very preliminary.
The percentage of Americans above the age of 45 was 28.4% in 1950
and rose to 49.4% by 2000. Older people tend to be wealthier because they
save throughout their lifetimes and because wages drift upwards with age3.
Wealthier people are more likely to participate in the stock market, thus
we would expect higher demand for stocks with an older population. Even
though people near retirement tend to switch from stocks back to safer
securities, a longer lifespan means more pre-retirement time to save and
invest in stocks, thus we should expect to see higher demand even when we
consider portfolio choice due to retirement. This larger demand for stocks
should lead to higher participation rates and a decreased equity premium.
The large mass of baby boomers reaching middle age should have a similar
effect.
While currently the model’s age dynamics are very simple, with the
probability of death constant each year (I am working on an extension), it
can nevertheless provide insight into the effects of an increased number of
older people in the population.
In 1950, 28.4% of the population was older than 45; by 2000 it rose to
49.4%. In my model, with the baseline probability of death 2.5%, 28.4% of
3Additionally, cross-sectional inequality of wealth grows with age because wage shocks
are persistent.
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the population is older than 49.7. To make a fair comparison, I calculate
the probability of death necessary to make 49.4% of the population be older
than 49.7, that probability of death is 1.41%4. In my model this number
means that the actual probability of death has nearly halved (and thus the
lifespan nearly doubled), however such a drastic change is meant to simulate
both longer life spans, and the high birthrates of the 1950’s which caused
the ratio of older people in the population to rise.
I have yet to compute equilibria for different sets of parameters. How-
ever, when I simulate the problem and use policy functions from the baseline
case but decrease the probability of death, excess bond demand becomes on
average negative (whereas it should be zero every period), indicating excess
demand for stocks. Additionally the equity premium drops from 5.7% to
5.1%.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that investment opportunities and the distribu-
tions of wealth and consumption are intimately linked and should be studied
together, if possible. The model is able to explain their joint trends over the
last quarter century. Other population demographics, such as age, also play
an important role in determining asset pricing.
A more in depth study of age dynamics can lead to predictions about
the future of asset prices. Extending this model to a more realistic life cycle
and considering retirement and bequest motives can provide insight into,
among other things, questions of social security. This is also a useful model
to study tax policy and how it relates to investment. Another potential
extension is a more realistic investment cost structure which will allow the
model to speak about volume and liquidity premia.
7 References
4P (Tdeath > N) = (1− Pdeath)N
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Table 1: Unconditional Moments
This table reports selected unconditional moments for β = .985,
θ = 10.5, F=3%, σ(ZS) = 17.5%. All results are in percentages.
Rf σ(Rf ) Re −Rf σ(Re) σ(∆c) σ(∆cSH) Participation
1.25 1.35 5.71 17.26 1.46 3.66 13.0
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Table 2: Asset Pricing.
Panel A is the average (through time) of the cross-sectional standard deviation of consumption
and capital growth. For panels B, C, and D each period the average consumption growth for a set
of agents is recorded; this becomes a time series of average individual consumption growth. This
series is denoted by 1
N
PN
i=1,N ∆Ct,i. Panel B shows the standard deviation of this time series,
as well as the analogous series for capital growth. Panel C shows the correlation of this series
with aggregate consumption growth and the excess return on the market. Panel D shows Euler
equation pricing errors from different formulations for the stochastic discount factor. Individual
denotes taking the pricing error for each individual, each period, then averaging across all years
and agents. Average uses the series from B and C to create a stochastic discount factor and price
assets. Aggregate uses aggregate consumption growth in the stochastic discount factor.
Panel A
Stockholders Non-Stockholders All
1
T
PT
t=1,T σi(∆Ct,i) .8 1.21 1.42
1
T
PT
t=1,T σi(∆Kt,i) 2.73 6.86 8.03
Panel B
Stockholders Non-Stockholders All
σT (
1
N
PN
i=1,N ∆Ct,i) 3.7 1.78 1.39
σT (
1
N
PN
i=1,N ∆Kt,i) 13.71 1.62 2.13
Panel C
Stockholders Non-Stockholders All
σT (
1
N
PN
i=1,N ∆Ct,i,∆C
Agg
t ) 96.7 99.2 99.9
σT (
1
N
PN
i=1,N ∆Ct,i, R
e
t+1 −Rft ) 99.3 74.6 96.8
Panel D
SH SH NSH NSH All All Aggregate
individual average individual average individual average
Rft .09 -.05 .06 -.87 -.4 -1.27 -1.57
Ret+1 −Rft .12 -.1 3.87 3.75 3.22 3.18 3.07
Panel E
β θ
Actual .985 10.5
∆CSH .976 10.2
∆CAgg .948 25.6
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Table 3: Wealth Inequality
Percentage of distribution belonging to the top agents.
Case Varible 1% 5% 10% 20% 30% Gini
Data 1983 Wealth 22 52 64 77 86 .76
Data 2004 Wealth 32 57 69 82 90 .80
Baseline Wealth 8 22 33 46 55 .33
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Table 4: Changing Costs, Wage Volatility, and Borrowing Constraints
This table reports selected unconditional moments from different specifications of the model. The
parameters being varied are the cost to investing in equity, cross-sectional volatility of wages,
and the borrowing constraint. Low wage volatility corresponds to σ(A) = 17.5% and σ(²) = 5%;
high wage volatility corresponds to σ(A) = 25% and σ(²) = 5%. Low costs are approximately
1.2% of wealth; high costs are approximately 1.7% of wealth. Tight borrowing allows individual
wealth to be approximately -16% times the wealth of the average agent; loose borrow-
ing allows individual wealth to be approximately -32% times the wealth of the average agent.
σ(Wage) Cost Borrow Top 1% Gini Wealth Gini Cons. Re −Rf Participation
Low High Tight 18.7 .389 .089 6.9 17.9
Low Low Tight 10.8 .292 .070 6.6 41.8
High High Tight 23.6 .479 .113 6.9 16.9
High Low Tight 20.4 .432 .099 6.4 22.4
High High Loose 25.3 .537 .106 7.1 16.5
High Low Loose 22.1 .472 .108 6.1 21.7
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Figure 1: Evolution of Gini Coefficients
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Figure 2: Business Cycle change of Wealth Distribution
The y-axis is the change in wealth held by the top quintile as a fraction of total wealth, x-axis is
the average market return, in excess of the risk free rate over the previous three years. Panel A
shows results from the model, Panel B is data from the SCF, Panel C is from Forbes 400.
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Figure 3: Timeline of events within a period
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Figure 4: Diagram of Numerical Solution Algorithm
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